Covid-19 lockdowns, income distribution, and food security: an analysis for South Africa by Arndt, Channing et al.
Global Food Security 26 (2020) 100410
Available online 17 July 2020
2211-9124/© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Covid-19 lockdowns, income distribution, and food security: An analysis for 
South Africa 
Channing Arndt a,*, Rob Davies b, Sherwin Gabriel a, Laurence Harris c,d, Konstantin Makrelov e, 
Sherman Robinson a, Stephanie Levy f, Witness Simbanegavi e, Dirk van Seventer b, 
Lillian Anderson a 
a Environment and Production Technology Division, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), USA 
b Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies, Pretoria, South Africa 
c School of Finance and Management, SOAS, United Kingdom 
d UNU-WIDER, Helsinki, Finland 
e Research Department, South African Reserve Bank, South Africa 
f Department of International Development, London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom   
A R T I C L E  I N F O   
Keywords: 
Food security 
Covid-19 impacts 
SAM multiplier Model 
Income distribution 
A B S T R A C T   
Absent vaccines and pharmaceutical interventions, the only tool available to mitigate its demographic effects is 
some measure of physical distancing, to reduce contagion by breaking social and economic contacts. Policy 
makers must balance the positive health effects of strong distancing measures, such as lockdowns, against their 
economic costs, especially the burdens imposed on low income and food insecure households. The distancing 
measures deployed by South Africa impose large economic costs and have negative implications for the factor 
distribution of income. Labor with low education levels are much more strongly affected than labor with sec-
ondary or tertiary education. As a result, households with low levels of educational attainment and high 
dependence on labor income would experience an enormous real income shock that would clearly jeopardize the 
food security of these households. However, in South Africa, total incomes for low income households are 
significantly insulated by government transfer payments. From public health, income distribution and food se-
curity perspectives, the remarkably rapid and severe shocks imposed because of Covid-19 illustrate the value of 
having in place transfer policies that support vulnerable households in the event of ‘black swan’ type shocks.   
1. Introduction 
The battle against the Covid-19 pandemic presents countries with 
difficult policy choices. Absent vaccines and pharmaceutical in-
terventions, the only tool available to mitigate its demographic effects is 
some measure of physical distancing, to reduce contagion by breaking 
social and economic contacts. Distancing measures adopted range from 
purely advisory to complete lockdown of households and non-essential 
producers. They impose a negative shock on the economy, with imme-
diate decline in economic activity followed by medium-term and long- 
term economic effects. The burden of these shocks is not borne 
equally across society. Policy makers must balance the positive health 
effects of the measures against their economic costs and the burdens 
imposed, particularly on low income and food insecure households. 
This paper examines the implications of lockdown policies for in-
come distribution and food security, using South Africa as a case 
country, with a focus on the role of social protection in preserving food 
security. Section 2 provides a brief literature review on the role of social 
protection in blunting shocks. Section 3 presents the lockdown policies 
pursued in South Africa. Section 4 describes the methodology employed 
and key data. Section 5 presents results with a focus on implications for 
earnings and total household income. Section 6 summarizes and con-
cludes, highlighting the important role of social protection policies as a 
buffer in the presence of shocks. 
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2. Shocks and social protection 
The role of social transfers to provide consumption support to 
households who cannot meet their subsistence needs has been exten-
sively studied (Barrientos and Hulme, 2016; World Bank, 2018; Hidrobo 
et al., 2018). Shocks studied include macroeconomic shocks (Galasso 
and Ravallion, 2004), refugee and protracted crisis (Bruck et al., 2019; 
Valli et al., 2019), and natural disasters (Skoufias, 2003). Another strand 
of the literature focuses on the response to supply shocks, such as food 
shortages, famines and droughts (Sen, 1986; Gilligan and Hoddinott, 
2007; Aker et al., 2011; Asfaw et al., 2017). Some social protection 
programs include interventions responding to seasonal and regional 
supply shocks, such as the Productive Safety Net (PSN) program in 
Ethiopia (World Bank, 2018). Others offer productive asset transfers 
(Rwanda, India) or multi-faceted ‘graduation packages’ that tackle 
causes of economic and social exclusion (Banerjee et al., 2015). 
The Covid-19 epidemic sets off a chain of events that runs from rapid 
increases in the share of the population infected to increasingly wide-
spread sickness with positive and non-trivial probability of death 
(especially for the elderly and those with co-morbidities) to public 
health policies designed to contain the pandemic. Unfortunately, these 
public health policies have very large implications for economic activity 
and income, as will be shown. These shocks are sufficiently large to push 
many households into positions of food insecurity, especially in the 
absence of countervailing policies such as social protection. The lock-
down can thus be characterized as a policy induced reduction in 
household capabilities (Sen, 1985).1 Increased food insecurity results 
principally from the severe shock to household income and the means to 
purchase food rather than to a supply shock such as drought. 
In the analysis performed, the food insecurity generated by the 
Covid-19 crisis is unrelated to the supply of food and unrelated to the 
logistics of food distribution.2 Because the source of insecurity is a 
collapse in earnings, transfers via social protection are important to 
counter the effects of lockdowns, at least in the short run. 
3. Lockdown policies in South Africa 
To fight the spread of Covid-19 and buy time to develop and 
implement a long run response, President Ramaphosa declared a Na-
tional State of Disaster with countermeasures on March 15, followed by 
a national stay-at-home (“Lockdown”) order issued on March 23, 
effective for three weeks from March 27. The initial three weeks was 
subsequently extended to five weeks, scheduled to end on April 30. 
The March 15 policies limited the size of public gatherings, imposed 
travel restrictions, suspended schools, closed ports of entry, and 
cancelled government events. The national stay-at-home regulations 
imposed on March 27 can be divided into two components:  
1. Preventing individuals from leaving their homes except under 
exceptional circumstances. They cannot go to work, unless employed 
in an essential sector, and are restricted in how and where they can 
spend their income.  
2. Closing non-essential industries, leading to declines in production 
and possibly large numbers of workers being laid off. 
Additional (voluntary) efforts by business and civil society included 
the suspension of major religious gatherings over Easter and discour-
aging outpatient and elective procedures at health facilities. 
Since the Lockdown exempted essential activities, a complete 
cessation of activity was not expected. In the tourism sector, for 
example, although front-line services such as accommodation and car 
rental were locked down, other activities such as reservations and other 
support services were expected to continue with limited staff. A 
description of the size and sectoral composition of the lockdown policies 
can be found in (Arndt et al., 2020). 
From both the demand and supply sides, the lockdown results in a 
massive decline in demand/supply of many industries. The effect is 
widespread across industries, but especially large in the service sectors 
(e.g., restaurants, entertainment, tourism, travel, hotels, etc.). The 
lockdown alone causes major impacts on employment, production, and 
demand. In addition, these impacts spill over into the macro economy. 
Industries are facing an uncertain future and are hesitant to engage in 
investment projects, resulting in a decline in aggregate investment. The 
pandemic is global, leading to a major decline in world trade. 
4. Methodology and data 
The direct impacts of the lockdown policies, combined with associ-
ated macro-economic shocks to household consumption, exports and 
investment, will have knock-on effects that spread through the entire 
economy. Reduced activity in one sector has consequences both for 
suppliers of intermediate inputs to that sector, who face lower demand, 
and for the users of the output of the sector, who face supply disruptions. 
These indirect effects are captured in input-output tables that focus on 
the flows of intermediate inputs across sectors in the economy. Addi-
tional indirect effects are captured by expanding input-output tables to a 
Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) that specifies income/expenditure 
flows for all economic agents. The SAM maps the “circular flow” of in-
come from production, to value added (payments to labor and capital), 
to the distribution of income to households, government, and aggregate 
investment and, finally, back to the demand for commodities (Pyatt and 
Round, 1979). 
The SAM supports a highly disaggregated linear multiplier model by 
converting the matrix flows to coefficients by dividing each entry by its 
column total. These coefficients are assumed to be fixed. In this speci-
fication, inputs into sectoral production are determined by fixed co-
efficients and value added is distributed in fixed proportions to 
households. The SAM is then partitioned into “endogenous” and 
“exogenous” accounts. The SAM-multiplier model deployed treats the 
elements of final demand (household consumption, investment, gov-
ernment expenditure, and exports) as exogenous variables that can be 
“shocked” to reflect the demand/supply effects of the lockdown policies. 
The SAM-multiplier model then solves for production by industries and 
all income flows: industry sales, value added (GDP and factor cost), and 
the distribution of income to households and government.3 
The 2015 SAM for South Africa identifies 62 industries and 104 
commodities (van Seventer et al., 2018). Income of labor is dis-
aggregated by type. Receipts (income) are distributed to enterprises, 
households, government, and the rest of the world. Capital earnings, 
labor earnings, and transfers from government and the rest of the world 
constitute household income. Households are broken down into 
household expenditure groups according to deciles. The lowest expen-
diture group (decile 0 or hhd-0) represents households that cover 0–10% 
of all households when they are ranked from low to high total expen-
diture. The top decile, 90–100%, is disaggregated into an additional 5 
groups, each representing 2% of all households. 
For the purposes of this analysis, sources of income are important. 
1 ’A person has to starve if his entitlement set does not include any com-
modity bundle with enough food … [as a result of some change in earnings such 
as] due to ill health … fall in wages, … [or] loss of employment.’ (Sen, 1986, p. 
9, p. 9).  
2 The lack of relation to logistic in the model deployed conforms to conditions 
pertaining during the initial lockdown period. Over time, the Covid-19 crisis 
likely poses an additional threat to food security via potential trade disruptions 
affecting market integration, transportation and imports. 
3 Arndt et al. (2020) provide the rationale for use of the SAM-multiplier 
model in the current context and include a mathematical appendix. Multi-
plier models are described in detail in Miller and Blair (2009). 
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These are illustrated in Table 1. Two important items emerge from the 
table. First, as expected, lower income households derive most of their 
labor earnings from lower educated labor and receive very little capital 
income. Second, dependence on transfers (government transfers domi-
nate) is very high for households at or below median income. 
5. Results 
Impacts are large. Fig. 1 presents impacts on the income components 
of GDP (at factor cost). Once all direct and indirect (knock-on) effects are 
considered, GDP at factor cost falls by 34 per cent. Indirect effects ac-
count for about 20 percentage points of the 34 while direct lockdown 
policy shocks account for about 14. Notably, the negative impact on 
income is bigger for lower educated workers. Wage earnings are down 
by about 30 per cent in total, but earnings by lower educated workers 
fall by more than 40 per cent. Gross operating surplus (capital earnings) 
is down by close to 40 per cent. These differential impacts reflect the 
varying impacts of lockdown on industries with different shares and 
composition of value added. 
These changes in factor incomes reflect quantity, and not wage, 
adjustments. Hence, the 40 per cent reduction in wage earnings in the 
lowest two education categories implies roughly a 40 per cent reduction 
in their hours worked. For a household dependent on wage earnings 
from low educated labor, these declines are clearly sufficient to threaten 
food security, particularly if the household was already vulnerable. 
Moving up the income distribution, the impact on hours worked for 
tertiary educated labor is less severe, at 26 per cent, as industries that 
intensively use highly skilled labor can adapt to lockdown with more 
flexible work arrangements. 
Changes in factor incomes have implications for the distribution of 
household income. Results are shown in Fig. 2. Lower income house-
holds suffer less than those at the upper end of the distribution. Several 
channels influence these results. Fig. 1 shows that wage earnings of 
lower educated suffer more than those of higher educated labor. Since 
low income households depend more on lower education earnings (see 
Table 1) one would expect their incomes to suffer more. The major 
reason this is not the case is that lower income households also receive 
significant exogenous transfers from the government, which are 
assumed to be unaltered. This transfer income makes up a larger share of 
the income of poor households than at the top end of the distribution. 
Combining these effects results in larger negative impacts on richer 
households. Middle income households rely more than the wealthy on 
lower educated wage earnings, but they are less cushioned than the poor 
by government transfers. 
Table 1 
Household sources of income.   
Income from Wages Capital 
Income 
Transfers from 
Gov and RoW 
Total 
flab- 
p 
flab- 
m 
flab- 
s 
flab- 
t 
hhd- 
0 
15.4 9.4 1.7 0.1 4.3 69.1 100.0 
hhd- 
1 
14.3 9.5 4.8 0.9 7.7 62.9 100.0 
hhd- 
2 
9.6 11.2 8.3 1.7 11.8 57.4 100.0 
hhd- 
3 
9.0 11.9 12.2 1.6 15.6 49.6 100.0 
hhd- 
4 
7.5 13.6 14.8 3.9 19.8 40.4 100.0 
hhd- 
5 
6.9 14.0 19.8 8.3 22.5 28.6 100.0 
hhd- 
6 
4.3 9.7 26.9 13.1 29.5 16.4 100.0 
hhd- 
7 
2.5 9.4 22.5 24.2 32.0 9.4 100.0 
hhd- 
8 
1.0 4.4 18.2 40.1 32.7 3.7 100.0 
hhd- 
91 
1.0 3.0 13.1 42.5 38.2 2.2 100.0 
hhd- 
92 
0.3 2.8 14.0 39.9 41.0 2.0 100.0 
hhd- 
93 
1.9 1.0 11.1 50.2 34.4 1.5 100.0 
hhd- 
94 
0.5 0.9 7.7 53.3 36.2 1.4 100.0 
hhd- 
95 
0.1 0.1 5.9 51.4 41.4 1.0 100.0 
Notes: Flab-p: primary school educated or less; flab-m: completed middle school; 
flab-s: completed secondary school; and flab-t: tertiary educated; hhd-0: lowest 
decile; hhd-91-hhd-95: top decile divided into 5 equal parts. 
Source: Estimated from the 2015 SAM (van Seventer et al., 2018). 
Fig. 1. Impacts on wage earnings and income GDP components, as percentage deviation from their pre-crisis levels. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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6. Summary, conclusions and future analytical needs 
The lockdown measures that South Africa has put into place to 
contain the novel coronavirus have negative implications for the factor 
distribution of income. Labor with low education levels are much more 
strongly affected than labor with secondary or tertiary education. 
Furthermore, the effects are very large. Reductions in hours worked by 
laborers with at most primary school education exceed 40 per cent while 
tertiary educated workers suffer a comparably much smaller but still 
very large reduction of about 26 per cent. Declines in use of capital are 
also large at nearly 40 per cent. 
Based on these results, households with low levels of educational 
attainment and high dependence on labor income would experience an 
enormous real income shock that would clearly jeopardize the food se-
curity of these households. This effect comes about under the assump-
tions of very mild direct impacts on food production, no effect on food 
prices, and no effect on food distribution channels. The effect is mainly 
the result of the lockdown policies imposed by South Africa to contain 
the novel coronavirus with a relatively small additional effect due to the 
policies imposed by other countries and their implications for demand 
for South African exports. 
In South Africa, total incomes for low income households are 
significantly insulated by government transfer payments. As a result of 
these transfer payments, incomes amongst low income households are, 
at least to some degree, protected. Continuation of these payments 
during the crisis is critical to maintaining food security amongst low 
income households. 
Looking more broadly at developing countries with strong lockdown 
measures to counter the spread of novel coronavirus but weak social 
protection networks, the food security outlook for low income house-
holds appears likely to be grim. Even with the social protection measures 
present in South Africa, the sustainability of the lockdown beyond a few 
weeks is open to question. In developing countries where food insecure 
households receive no or very limited support, low income households 
will very rapidly confront a choice between seeking to generate income 
to prevent starvation and accept the risk of becoming infected, despite 
any official lockdown measures. From public health, income distribution 
and food security perspectives, the remarkably rapid and severe shocks 
imposed because of Covid-19 illustrate the value of having in place 
transfer policies that support vulnerable households in the event of 
‘black swan’ type shocks. 
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